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FLORIDA'S SEXUAL BATTERY STATUTE

pose the defects in the present system and provide a first important step in
counteracting the historical bias against the victim.
E. SuE BimnE

NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE: IS ELIMINATING PAIN AND
SUFFERING A VIABLE OPTION UNDER THE
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?*
The cost of automobile insurance in Florida more than doubled during the
last three years.' Auto insurance has become so expensive that in March of 1977
the Florida Department of Insurance estimated that 1,400,0002 of the state's six
million drivers 3 were breaking mandatory insurance laws because they could
not afford the premiums and that as many as 40 per cent of the drivers in some
parts of the state were driving without automobile insurance. 4 In addition, the
number of drivers who could not purchase auto insurance in the open market
at any price more than doubled. 5 Even after imposing rate increases, auto insurance companies continue to claim dissatisfaction with the Florida market
and insurance laws.6 In spite of major changes in Florida's no-fault law made
in 1977, observers express little hope for improvement.
The auto insurance crisis has prompted calls for radical reforms in the tort
7
system currently relied upon for compensating automobile accident victims.
Reformists are urging the elimination of the speculative damages that are a
*EorroR's NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the Fall 1977 quarter.
1. Gunter, A Program to Solve the Automobile Insurance Rate Crisis 5 (March 21, 1977)
(pamphlet issued by the Florida Department of Insurance) [hereinafter cited as Insurance
Dep't Report].
2. Id. However, subsequent to the March report the 1977 Florida Legislature has greatly
reduced the amount of mandatory insurance. See notes 145-151 infra and accompanying text.
The probable result will be to reduce the number of drivers in violation of the mandatory
insurance laws. See 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468, §31. The Florida Insurance and Tort Reform
Act of 1971. Nevertheless, the available statistics indicate that a substantial number of Florida
motorists have little or no insurance, and Florida Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter stated
that the 1977 law offered no relief for the basic rate crisis in the Florida auto insurance
market. See Florida Department of Insurance, Press Release (June 1977).
3. Florida had 6,135,720 drivers as of April 16, 1976. FLORiDA STATISTICAL AaRAcr 1976.
4. Insurance Dep't Report, supra note 1, at 5. The Department pointed out that the
number of mandatory insurance law violators was highest in Dade County (Miami), where
premiums are the highest in the state. Id. at 33.
5. This increase is reflected by the number of motorists who have been forced to obtain
their insurance from Florida's insurer of last resort, the Joint Underwriting Association, because no private insurer would write them a policy. In the last two years this number rose
from 202,000 to 416,000. Id.
6. The three largest insurance companies did report profits in the first 6 months of 197.7.
However, these profits did not override the losses from the last three years. See Gainesville
Sun, Nov. 14, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
7. See Kalven, A Schema of Alternatives to the Present Auto Accident Tort System, 1
CONN. L. REv. 33 (1968).
8. For a definition of speculative damages see nQt 9 infra (report introduced by Senator

McKay).
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traditional element of recovery in many automobile negligence suits.9 They
contend that, with "pain and suffering" damages reaching record highs, new
dimensions of fraud abound as plaintiffs and their contingent-fee lawyers seek
huge damage jackpots1o Further, they claim that while 25 cents of every insurance dollar are paid out as speculative damages," our mobile society cannot
afford the premiums needed to protect drivers from the threat of million-dollar
litigation.12
This note will explore the attempt by the Florida Legislature to remedy
the insurance crisis and will examine the legality of any proposal to eliminate
speculative damages. First, an explanation of the mechanics of no-fault auto
insurance will be presented, showing how this relatively recent partial prohibition of speculative damages has been treated by the courts. Second, an examination is made of why Florida and other states with "right to redress" clauses in
their state constitutions may face particular problems with any legislative attempt to eliminate speculative damages from automobile litigation. Finally, a
review of the legislative changes to Florida's no-fault laws will be undertaken,
followed by an analysis of their possible vulnerability to attack based on provisions in the state constitution.
NO-FAULT: How

IT WORKS

The no-fault era began in 1965 with the publication of Basic Protection for
the Traffic Victim," by Professors Robert E. Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell
They pointed out that compensating victims of automobile negligence through
the traditional system of tort liability led to delays, inequities, needless expenses, and temptations to dishonesty.' 4 All 24 states that have adopted no-fault
legislationa have included variations of their three basic proposals 5 aimed at
9. See, e.g., Leatherberry, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Will the Poor Pay More
Again?, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 101, 128 (1975). One of the most vocal advocates for the
elimination of speculative damages has been Florida Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter.
See Insurance Dep't Report, supra note 1, at 47. See also Fla. S. 871 (Reg. Sess. 1977, introduced by S. McKay). "It is the intent of the Legislature to specifically prohibit recovery in
tort of damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience, disability, incapacity,
disfigurement, loss of consortium, and all other such damages which cannot be measured in
monetary terms except upon an arbitrary basis." Id at 21.
10. Insurance Dep't Report, supra note 1, at 17. The Department estimated that "elements of fraud exist in as many as 30% of all the automobile liability insurance claims in
the State. In Southeast Florida, those estimates are closer to 40%, and sometimes even higher."
Id. at 28.
11. Id. at 24. "Speculative damages (including attorneys' fees and the cost of claims administration), account for approximately 25 cents of every insurance dollar. Looked at another way, 'pain and suffering' has become, in Florida, a $190,000,000 annual industry." Id.
12. See, e.g., City of Tamarac v. Garchar, Case No. 77-97 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.) (in the trial
court the plaintiff received a $6,000,000 jury verdict that included some $4,000,000 for pain
and suffering).
13. R. KEETON AND J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIClaIM (1965).
14. Id. at 11-74.
15. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§66-4014 to 66-4021 (1975) (eff. July 1, 1974); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§10-4-701 to 10-4-723 (1973) (eff. April 1, 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§39-319 to 38-351a
(1977) (eff. Jan., 1973); DEL. COnE tit. 21, §2118 (1974) (eff. Jan., 1972); FLA. STAT. §§627.730627.741 (1975) (eft. Jan. 1, 1972); GA. CODE ANN. §§56-3401b to 56-3413b (1977) (eff. March 1,
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improving automobile accident compensation: first, require first party coverage
for all out-of-pocket economic losses up to a specified amount to be paid to
the insured by his insurance company, regardless of who was at fault in an
automobile accident; second, eliminate all tort actions based on negligence if
losses do not exceed the no-fault benefits; and third, eliminate pain and suffering as an element of damages except in cases of severe injury. 7 The philosophy
underlying this approach holds that no moral culpability attaches when someone, through simple negligence, causes an auto accident.', Proponents reason
that the costs of proving fault, the delays of our judicial system, 9 and abuses
by fortune seekers outweigh the benefits of awarding elusive monetary compensation 20 and punishing the driver at fault by awards of pain and suffering
damages. The states that have adopted variations of Keeton and O'Connell's
plan have been testing the validity of these arguments since 1971.21
1975); HAW. REV. STAT. §§294-1 to 294-41 (1975) (eff. Sept. 1, 1974); KAN. STAT. §§40-3101 to
40-3121 (1973) (eff. Jan., 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. §§304.39-010 to 304.39-340 and 304.99-050
Jan., 1973); MASS.
(1975) (eff. July 1, 1975); MD.ANN. CODE, art. 48A §§538-546 (1977) (eft.
GrN. LAws ANN. ch. 90 §34m; ch. 175, §113B; ch. 231, §6d (1975) (efl. Jan., 1971); MICH.
CoMp. LAws ANN. §§500.3101-500.3179 (1977) (efl. Oct., 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§65B.4165B.71 (1977) (eft. Jan. 1, 1975); NEv. REv. STAT. §§698.010-.510 (1973) (eff. Feb., 1974); N.J.
STAT. AN. §§39:6A-1 to 39:6A-20 (1973) (efl. Jan., 1973); N.Y. INS. LAW §§670-677 (1975)
(eft.
Feb. 1, 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE §§26-41-1 to 26-41-18 (1977) (efl. Jan. 1, 1976); OR.REV.
STAT. §743.800-743.835 (1976) (efl. Jan., 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§1009.101-.701 (1977)
(eft.July 19, 1975); S.C. CODE §§56-11-10 to 56-11-800 (1976) (efl. Oct. 1, 1974); S.D. COMPILED
LAws ANN. §§58-23-6 to 58-23-8 (1977) (eft.Jan., 1972); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (1976)
(efl. Aug., 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §§31-41-1 to 31-41-14 (1974) (eff. Jan., 1974); VA. CODE
July, 1972).
§§38.1-380.1 to 38.1-380.2 (1976) (eft.
16. R. KEErON & J. O'CONNELL, supranote 13, at 273.
17. Eight states that have adopted some form of no-fault insurance have not adopted the
complimentary tort immunity. They are Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas and Virginia. These states' provisions are called "Add-On Plans"

because they simply add personal injury protection (PIP) insurance to the existing tort system.
See Henderson, No-Fault Insurance for Automobile Accidents: Status and Effect in the United
States, 56 OR. L. REv. 287, 288 (1977).
18. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 23 n.17, 271 N.E.2d 592, 606 (1971), where the court
stated: "The day has long since passed when legal negligence in the automobile accident
situation could be equated with moral culpability. The whole concept of negligence has in
fact become something of a fiction, since in many cases fault cannot meaningfully be placed
on any one of the parties more than on another. The new comparative negligence statute is
a recognition of 'this inherent difficulty of assigning fault to one party only. The legally
negligent driver is therefore morally as entitled to compensation as the other parties." See also
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (1973) (adoption by the Florida supreme court of comparative negligence).
19. It is estimated that only 44 cents out of every premium dollar actually goes to compensate victims. The other 56 cents is divided between general overhead of the insurance

industry (33 cents) and the individual claims administration cost for the defense (13 cents)
and claimants (10 cents). KEETON & KEETON, CASE AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 514
(1971).
20. In cases where no serious injury has occurred, this nominal compensation is often
used solely to pay legal fees. The U.S. Department of Transportation estimates that 25%
of the total tort recovery in death and serious injury cases is spent on attorney fees and
other legal costs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION
STUDY, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCmENT INuJRIES 48 (1970).
21. See note 15 supra.
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Basically, no-fault automobile insurance 2 2 requires that each driver insure
himself for personal injury protection (PIP coverage) up to a cerain limit.23
The no-fault PIP coverage pays for medical, hospital, and other health-related
expenses and for loss of earnings up to the aggregate PIP liability limit.24
When an accident results in nonserious injuries, each driver collects his
monetary losses arising from personal bodily injuries from his own insurer.
Additionally, the no-fault law provides that as long as the PIP insurance is
purchased as required, owners, registrants, operators, and occupants of the
insured vehicles will be exempt from tort liability for all bodily injuries suffered by any person involved in an automobile accident, unless the injuries
result in monetary losses that exceed the amount of PIP coverage 25 or the
victim meets a personal injury tort threshold. 26 Also, defendants cannot be
sued for speculative damages, even if monetary damages exceed PIP coverage,
unless the victim meets a personal injury tort threshold.2 7 Personal injury tort
thresholds are usually defined in terms of a dollar amount of monetary losses,
a statutorily defined specific type of injury, or both.28 State legislatures that
have adopted such tort thresholds have abolished the right to speculative damages for those who do not meet the threshold.
22. Throughout this note, the term "no-fault automobile insurance" refers to what has
become known as a "modified plan" of no-fault insurance. For a full discussion of the various
categories of no-fault, see J. O'CONNELL fi R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND
278-85 (1975).
23. Florida requires that every owner of a motor vehicle obtain insurance with PIP
benefits of at least $5,000. See FLA. STAT. §627.733(3) (1977).
24. Unlike most states which have laws requiring the PIP insurers to pay 100% of
the economic losses up to the PIP limit, Florida now requires only that the insurer pay
80% of the medical expenses and lost wages up to the total liability exposure of $5,000.
FLA. STAT. §627.736(1) (1977). These benefits are payable to the "named insured, relatives
residing in the same household, persons operating the insured motor vehicle, passengers in
such motor vehicle, and other persons struck by such motor vehicle and suffering bodily injury while not an occupant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle .... Id. In addition, the PIP
benefits include a provision for funeral benefits "in an amount not to exceed $1,000 per individual." FLA. STAT. §627.736(l)(c) (Supp. 1976).
25. If the monetary injuries exceed the $5,000 PIP limit, but the victim does not meet
one of the personal injury thresholds, the driver at fault is liable in tort for the monetary
injuries in excess of those covered by th victim's PIP insurer. FLA. STAT. §627.737(1) (1975).
26. In Florida the personal injury tort threshold is defined as follows: "(a) Loss of a body
member, (b) Permanent loss of a bodily function, (c) Permanent injury within a reasonable
degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement, (d) Significant permanent
scarring or disfigurement, (e) A serious, nonpermanent injury which has a material degree of
bearing on the injured person's ability to resume his normal activity and lifestyle during all
or substantially all of the 90-day period after the occurrence of the injury, and the effects of
which are medically or scientifically demonstrable at the end of such period, (f)Death." FLA.
STAT. §627.737(2) (Supp. 1976).
27. FLA. STAT. §627.737(l), (2) (1975).
28. Most states' tort thresholds include a specific amount of medical expenses, for example, $500, as one of their thresholds. That is, when a victim incurs $500 of reasonable
medical expenses as a result of an accident, he is entitled to sue for pain and suffering damages. For a review of the pain and suffering tort thresholds, see Leatherberry, supra note 9, at
175. Unlike most states, Florida no longer includes an amount of medical expenses as one of
its tort thresholds. See note 26 supra.
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Current proposals for the wholesale abrogation of speculative damages in
automobile negligence suits can be evaluated from the outcome of litigation
that has challenged no-fault legislation and its partial elimination of traditional common law damages. Ten state courts of last resort have reviewed the
validity of such legislation. 29 These decisions discuss many of the arguments
likely to be evoked by legislative attempts to eliminate any common law
remedy.
OBJECTIONS BAsED ON THE U. S. CONSTITUTION

Tort thresholds that partially eliminate the right to sue for speculative
damages have faced two major objections based on the United States Constitution. The first is based on a claim that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment prohibits the abrogation of the common law right to sue in tort
unless an adequate substitute remedy is provided. The "adequate substitute
remedy" test was derived from dictum in the United States Supreme Court
opinion of New York Cent. R.R. v. White.30 In rejecting challenges to New

York's Workmen's Compensation Law, the Court stated that "[i]t perhaps may
be doubted whether the state could abolish all rights of action, on the one
hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting up something adequate in
their stead."31 . Challengers seized upon this language to assert that the no-fault
thresholds were unconstitutional. However, when confronted by this argument
2
the state courts have generally rejected it,3
by often relying on a more recent
33
Supreme Court case, Silver v. Silver. In that case, the Court upheld the validity of Connecticut's automobile guest statute,3 4 concluding that the Constitu-

tion "does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones
recognized by the common law to attain a permissible legislative objective."3s
29. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971) (upholding no-fault legislation); Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill.
2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) (holding the no-fault legislation
in violation of several state constitutional provisions); Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205,
304 A.2d 881 (1973) (answeiing the legislature's questions by approving the concept of nofault); Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (upholding the personal injury
portion of no-fault); Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974) (upholding nofault legislation); Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975) (validating no-fault
legislation); Farm v.McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975) (upholding no-fault legislation);
Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1975) (upholding no-fault laws); Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 44 (1975) (upholding no-fault
laws); Rybeck v. Rybeck, 141 N.J. Super. 481, 358 A.2d 828 (1976) (upholding no-fault legislation).
30. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
31. Id. at 201. However, the Court added that "[n]o such question is here presented, and
we intimate no opinion upon it." Id.
32. See Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 212, 304 A.2d 881, 886 (1973); Manzanares
v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 599, 522 P.2d 1291, 1301 (1974); Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 393,
346 A.2d 897, 903 (1975); Rybeck v. Rybeck, 141 N.J. Super. 481, 505, 358 A.2d 828, 842 (1976).
33. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
34. The law provided that passengers transported gratuitously as guests in a privately
owned and operated automobile were prohibited from recovering from the owner or operator
of the vehicle for injuries caused by his ordinary negligence. They could recover if the act
causing the injury was intentional or grossly negligent. See 1927 Conn. Pub. Acts, ch. 308.
35. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) (this too was clearly dictum). See also Munn v.
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Similarly, most state courts have rejected the idea that an adequate alternative
remedy is required by the due process clause. Some state courts have avoided
the issue by simply finding that their respective no-fault laws provided an adequate substitute. 36 According to most authorities, however, the only due process
requirement to be met is that the legislation have a "fair and substantial rela37
tion to the object of the legislation."
The second objection is that no-fault laws violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 38 According to this view, the exclusion of
certain types of motor vehicles discriminates unfairly between motor vehicle
owners. 39 Its proponents argue that the availability of the tort immunity may
depend on the type of vehicle driven. Additionally, equal protection is said to
be denied because no-fault laws create a wealth-based classification 4 resulting
from their use of a fixed dollar amount of medical services as one of the personal injury thresholds. 41 Because the rich seek more expensive medical care,
the argument goes, they arc more likely to exceed the dollar threshold and sue
for pain and suffering.4- Courts have held, however, that there is a rational
basis for the existence of these separate classifications.43 Moreover, with the
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) ("A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of
the common law.").
36. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 21, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971); Montgomery v.
Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 57, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 15 (1975); Shavers v. Attorney Gen., 65 Mich. App.
555, 370, 237 N.W.2d 325, 332 (1975). These courts did not reach the issue of whether the
laws involved would be deficient in the absence of an adequate alternative remedy.
37. Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 213, 304 A.2d 881, 887 (1973) (the New Hampshire supreme court observed that raising the threshold from $500 to $1,000 would have no
effect on the legislation's constitutionality, since this would bear a substantial relation to the
legislature's objective of reducing tort claims). See also Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So.
2d 9, 17 (Fla. 1974).
38. For a full discussion of various equal protection arguments, see Castle, No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 1974 ANN. SURVEY AM. LAw 225, 234 (1976).
39. For an example of this discrimination, see FLA. STAT. §627.732(1) (1975), which excludes all taxis, motorcycles, buses, and commercial vehicles from its definition of motor
vehicles are covered by the Florida no-fault act. Thus an injured pedestrian may or may not
be able to sue the driver for pain and suffering, depending on the type of vehicle that hit
him.

40. Wealth discrimination does not invoke strict scrutiny. See San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,29 (1973).
41. See note 28 supra.
42. In Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill.
2d 748, 283 N.E.2d 747 (1972), the trial court had held
the Illinois no-fault statute was unconstitutional due to the different effects it had on the rich
and the poor. Id. But because the Illinois supreme court held the law unconstitutional on
other grounds, it did not reach the merits of the discrimination argument. In New York, a
lower court held that state's $500 threshold to be discriminatory, but the Court of Appeals
reversed. Montgomery v. Daniels, 81 Misc. 2d 373, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419, rev'd, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1,
340 N.E.2d 444 (1975).
43. See, e.g., Rybeck v. Rybeck, 114 N.J. Super. 481, 358 A.2d 828, 834 (1976). But cf.
Shavers v. Attorney Gen., 65 Mich. App. 355, 369, 237 N.W.2d 325, 334 (1975) (where the
court held that the property protection provisions of Michigan's no-fault act were violative of
both the due process and equal protection clauses; however, the same court specifically upheld the personal injury provisions of the same act); Lasky v. State Farms Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d
9, 21 (Fla. 1974) (the Florida supreme court held a threshold, "fracture to a weight-bearing
bone", to be arbitrary and unreasonable and thus violative of the equal protection clause).
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total elimination of speculative damages, the second equal protection argument would vanish because poor and rich alike would be denied a basis for
recovery.
OBJECrIONS UNDER VARIOUS STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Challengers of no-fault laws abrograting common law remedies have also
looked to state constitutional guarantees for support. The general view of the
courts, however, has been to affirm elimination of rights to damage recoveries.44
Nonetheless, a significant minority viewpoint has emerged, with two states,
Florida and Connecticut, compelling a more careful scrutiny of such legislation. 45
Most state constitutions were not expected to be major obstacles to nofault.46 However, a major objection to no-fault thresholds was expected in those
states which had state constitutional provisions expressly forbidding the enactment of any law limiting the amount recoverable for personal injuries and
death.47 Professors Keeton and O'Connell thought these provisions would stand
implacably in the path of no-fault, 48 but the courts thus far have dispelled this
concern. 49 The Pennsylvania supreme court reasoned that such a provision was
not violated if there was an abolition or modification of a cause of action,
rather than an elimination or change of a remedy.55 The Kentucky supreme
court, on the other hand, upheld its no-fault law on the theory that motorists
gave their implied consent to waive such a constitutional right.51
In spite of the trend toward ratification in other states, 52 the Florida supreme court objected in 1973 to the wholesale abrogation of common law
44. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971); Opinion of the
Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 304 A.2d 881 (1974); Manazanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291
(1974); Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975); Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d
770 (Ky. 1975); Montgomery v. Daniels, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 444 (1975); Rybeck v.
Rybeck, 141 N.J. Super. 481, 358 A.2d 828 (1976).
45. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) and Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 263,
363 A.2d 1 (1975).
46. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971): "Finally, argument has been
made to us that ... [the no-fault law] ... violates art. II (remedies by recourse to the law
to be free, complete and prompt), art. 15 (right to trial by jury sacred), and art. 30 (separaIt is entirely clear that the statute
tion of executive, judicial and legislative departments) ....
violates none of them." Id. at 31.
47. See, e.g., ARiz. CONsT. art. II, §31 (1956); ARK. CONST. art. V, §32 (1947); Ky. CONST.
§54 (1969); PA. CONsr. art. III, §18 (1969); Wyo. CONsT. art. X, §4 (1957).
48. R. KEErON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 13, at 504.
49. See Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975); Fann v. McGuffey, 534
S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975).
50. Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897, 902 (1975). It seems that courts will
thus go a long way to uphold no-fault legislation.
51. Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770, 776 (Ky. 1975).
52. But cf. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). The court
held that a mandatory arbitration clause of the no-fault act violated the state prohibition
against "fee officers in the judicial system" and a state constitutional provision giving original
jurisdiction of all justidable matters to the circuit courts. The law also was found to be in
violation of a provision declaring that no special law shall be passed when a general law can
be made applicable. Id. See also Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 212, 304 A.2d 881, 886
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remedies. In Kluger v. White, 53 the court gave new vitality to a state constitutional provision declaring a right to redress of any injury.5 4 The court held that
the right to redress provision requires that if the legislature abolishes a com55
mon law remedy, an adequate alternative remedy must be provided. This
decision has possible nationwide implication with regard to the elimination of
speculative damages, since at least 29 other states have right to redress provisions similar to Florida's.5 6 It has been followed by the Supreme Court of
Connecticut, which in Gentile v. Altermatt57 adopted the alternative remedy
test. That court reasoned that the right to redress provision of the Connecticut
Constitution prohibited its legislature from entirely abolishing the rights existing at the time of its adoption. The court concluded, "Rather, the legislature
retains the power to provide reasonable alternatives to the enforcement of such
rights."5s
59
While four states have rejected the adequate alternative remedy test, other
states may be more sympathetic. Many states whose courts have traditionally
applied the adequate alternative remedy test have not yet adopted no-fault in60
surance, while the laws of others have not been tested in their highest court.
Therefore, the impact of Florida case law may be the major obstacle to the
elimination of speculative damages in other states.
FLORIDA'S

Kluger AND Lasky

DECISIONS

61

As of 1973, Florida's no-fault law, enacted in 1971, contained the following provisions: first, the statute provided for mandatory first party personal
injury protection (PIP) insurance of $5,000;6 2 second, the legislature provided
for complementary tort immunity so that no defendant in an automobile negligence suit could be sued for either economic losses covered by PIP insurance or
for speculative pain and suffering damages, unless the victim met a personal injury tort threshold.1.3 In addition, Florida had carried the no-fault concept over into the property damage area.6 4 Although the legislature did not
(1973) New Hampshire supreme court also holding mandatory arbitration provision in violation of state's guarantee of a jury trial).
53. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). See notes 66-78 infra and accompanying text.
54. FLA. CONsT. art. I, §21 (1975).
55. 281 So. 2d 1, 4. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
56. For a list of these state constitutional provisions, see Comment, "No-Fault" Insurance

Lack of Reasonable Substitute for Eliminated Cause of Action for Property Damage Violates
State Constitution,4 MEM. ST. L. REv. 635, 639 n.31 (1974).
57. 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1975).
58. Id. at 286.
59. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 12, 271 N.E.2d 592, 606 (1971); Opinion of the
Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 212, 304 A.2d 881, 885 (1973); Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 599,
522 P.2d 1291, 1301 (1974); Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 393, 346 A.2d 897, 903 (1975).
60. See Note, Constitutional Guarantees of a Certain Remedy, 49 IA. L. R~v. 1202, 1206
(1964); 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §710, at 1218-19 (1956).
-

61.

FLA. STAT. §§627.733-.741 (1971).

62. FLA. STAT. §627.736 (1971).
63. FLA. STAT. §627.737 (1973).
64. Florida, Massachusetts, and Michigan have had some form of no-fault insurance for
automobile property damage. Florida's was declared unconstitutional in Kluger v. White, 281
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provide for mandatory first party property damage insurance, it exempted each
automobile owner from liability for property damage up to $550 caused to
5
another vehicle required to be insured by the act. The effect of the legislation
was that accident victims could no longer sue for either speculative damages or
property damage unless they met the respective tort thresholds.
The first of the two thresholds to be tested in the Florida courts was the
provision barring recovery for automobile property damage which totaled less
than $550. In Kluger v. WhiteGc8 involving a suit for automobile property
damage, the plaintiff alleged that the driver of the defendant's car was negligent and had been formally charged with failing to yield the right of way. The
accident did not result in personal injuries, but the appellant's car was totally
demolished. The car had a fair market value of $250,67 $300 less than the prescribed $550 property damage threshold. Plaintiff, though insured, had not
purchased first party coverage for property damage. Thus under the statute he
fell into that class of accident victims with no recourse against any person or
6
insurer for loss caused by the fault of another.
The court ruled that the property damage threshold provision of the nofault act was unconstitutional, 69 basing its decision on Article I, section 21, of
the Florida Constitution, which provides:
injury, and
"The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any
70
justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
The court enunciated a standard which any legislative abrogation of a common
law remedy would have to meet, holding:
[Where a right to access to the courts for redress for a particular injury
has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the DeclaSo. 2d I (Fla. 1973). The Massachusetts law was repealed. See 1976 Mass. Acts, ch. 266, §7.
Only Michigan's remains in operation, but it has been declared unconstitutional by an intermediate appellate court and is pending further appeal to the state supreme court. See Shavers
v. Attorney Gen., 65 Mich. App. 355, 237 N.W.2d 555 (1975).
65. 1971 Fla. Laws, ch. 71-252, §10 (repealed 1976), provided that except in cases of
willful or wanton misconduct, or damage to a parked vehicle, every owner, registrant, operator
or occupant of a motor vehicle covered by no-fault insurance, was exempted for tort liability
for property damage caused to another vehicle subject to the no-fault act. However, "an

owner who has elected not to purchase insurance with respect to property damage to his
motor vehicle may maintain an action of tort therefor against the owner, registrant, operator or occupant of a motor vehicle causing such damage if such damage exceeds five
hundred and fifty dollars...." Id. The Act also provided that the insurer of the damaged
vehicle could recover what it had paid from the insurer of the vehicle causing the damage.
66. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
67. Id. at 2. The cost of repairing the damages to the car was $774.95; however, since the
car was worth only $250.00, plaintiff could recover only the lesser amount.
68. It is interesting to note that "[a]ppellant alleged that the Manchester agent had not
specifically explained to her the possible results of failing to include property damage coverage." Id.
69. See Comment, No-Fault Automobile PropertyProtection-Legislature's Abrogation of
Common Law Tort Right to Recover Property Damage of Less Than $550 Violates Florida
Constitution,2 FLA. ST. L. REv. 178 (1974).
70. FLA. CONST. art. I, §21 (1975).
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ration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where
such right has become a part of the common law of the State pursuant
to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is without power to abolish
such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the
rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of
such right, and1 no alternative method of meeting such public necessity
can be shown7
The majority pointed out that the "reasonable alternative" test, although
stated specifically for the first time in Kluger, was consistent with past precedent72 In answering the defendant's argument that previous decisions had
approved of the abolition of tort rights, the court distinguished prior legislative initiatives from the property provisions of the Florida No-Fault Automobile Insurance Law. First, the court pointed out that the guest statute
merely changed the degree of negligence required for a passenger to maintain
a tort action against the driver; it did not abolish his right to sue. 73 Second, the
court conceded that the Workmen's Compensation Law had eliminated a tort
right; 74 however, the majority emphasized that this law provided "adequate,
sufficient, and even preferable safeguards" for employees, thereby satisfying the
reasonable alternative test. 5 Third, examining the legislature's complete
abrogation of the right to sue for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of contract to marry, 76 the court reiterated that
these tort actions had become instruments of blackmail. It reasoned that an
overpowering public interest justified the elimination of these rights, and,
therefore, no alternative remedy was required. 7 7 In Kluger, because no such
public necessity was seen to exist for the abolition of the right to sue for automobile property damage, the statute was invalidated7 s
The personal injury threshold79 was tested soon afterward in Lasky v. State
71. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
72. The court noted that it had previously held that the Declaration of Rights of the
Florida Constitution applied to the legislature as well as the government. 281 So. 2d at 4
(citing Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926)). See also Holland v. Mayes,
155 Fla. 129, 133, 19 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 1944) (the court noted that Article I, §21 "was designed to give life and vitality to this maxim" that for every wrong there is a remedy); Cason
v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 21 So. 2d 243 (1944) (the court interpreted article I, §21 of the Florida
Constitution to mean that for every injury caused to an individual there is a remedy provided
by either statutory or common lau).
73. 1937 Fla. Laws, ch. 18033 (repealed 1971). The guest statute provided that nonpaying
passengers could recover damages from the driver only if he had been grossly negligent. See
McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So. 2d 867 (1942) (where the law withstood a challenge
based on Florida's Declaration of Rights). See also note 34 supra.
74. FLA. STAT. §§440.01-.58 (1975).
75. 281 So. 2d at 4.
76. See FLA. STAT. §§771.01-.08 (1977) (which abolished the right to sue for alienation of
affections, criminal conversation, scducation and breach of contract to marry as of 1945). This
statute was upheld despite an argument based on the Florida Declaration of Rights in
Rotwein v. Gerstein, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948).
77. 281 So. 2d at 4.
78. Id. at 5.
79. At the time of the 1974 Florida supreme court decision in Lasky v. State Farm Ins.
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Farm Insurance Co. 80 The Lasky court emphasized the difference between the
property and speculative damage thresholds. Under Florida's No-Fault Act the
legislature did not require motorists to purchase first party insurance against
property damage. However, the owner of a motor vehicle was required to
maintain security, either by insurance or otherwise, for personal injury protection up to $5,000.81 The statute specifically provided that tort immunity could
be granted only if both the vehicles and drivers involved in an accident were
insured as required. 2 Because of this distinction the court found that an alternative remedy was provided by the legislature. The court stated:
In exchange for his former right to damages for pain and suffering in
the limited category of cases where such items are preempted by the act,
he receives not only a prompt recovery of his major, salient out-of-pocket
losses - even where he is at fault - but also an immunity from being
held liable for the pain and suffering of the other parties to the accident
fall within this limited class where such items are not
if they should
83
recoverable.
The court concluded that the benefits received under the no-fault law were a
"reasonable alternative" to the common law remedy denied.84 Accordingly, it
was held that the personal injury threshold did not violate the declaration of
rights provision of the Florida Constitution.85
SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW REFINING THE

Kluger TEST

The "reasonable alternative remedy" test adopted in Kluger has been refined through its application in other areas of the law. Two of Florida's legislative enactments - the Workmen's Compensation Law86 and the Wrongful
Death Act 7 - have received particular scrutiny under the test. Analysis of the
decisive factors in these decisions can be helpful in understanding the legal
status of any attempt to eliminate speculative damages in Florida.
Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), a personal injury tort action could only be brought when (1)
medical benefits paid by the PIP insurer exceeded $1000, or (2) "the injury or disease
consists in whole or in part of permanent disfigurement, a fracture to a weight-bearing
bone, a compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture, loss of a body member, permanent injury within reasonable medical probability, permanent loss of a bodily
function, or death." FLA. STAT. §627.737(2) (1971) (amended 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-266 §5).
For an explanation of the new threshold see note 26 supra.
80. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
81. FLA. STAT. §627.733(3) (1971).
82. FLA. STAT. §627.737(1) (1971).
83. 296 So. 2d at 14.
84. Id. at 15.
85. However, the court in Lasky did find that one provision of the personal injury
threshold violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. It found that permitting recovery for pain and suffering, if the injury
involved in whole or in part a fracture to a weight-bearing bone, without regard to medical
payments or whether the injury resulted in death or permanent injury, was arbitrary and
unreasonable and thus denied equal protection. Id. at 18.
86. FtLA. STAT. §§440.01-.58 (1975).
87. FLA. STAT. §§768.16-.27 (1975).
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Workmen's Compensation generates considerations that are seemingly
analogous to those of no-fault insurance. Because Workmen's Compensation
enjoys long standing court approval, proponents of no-fault argue that this
endorsement will be extended to the automobile insurance laws. 8 Upon closer
examination, however, crucial differences emerge between the two systems of
compensation.
Initially, courts viewed Workmen's Compensation as a contract, presumed
by statute, between every employer and employee.8 9 As originally enacted, the
law permitted either the employee or employer to reject coverage of the act 9o
and opt for reliance on their original common law remedies and defenses. In
1970, the legislature revised Workmen's Compensation to make coverage under
the act mandatory, 91 thereby making the waiver of common law remedies compulsory.92 Discussing this development in dictum, the Kluger court stated that
these rules were constitutional because the act provided for a reasonable alternative remedy.93 In exchange for his common law rights, the worker benefits
from insurance purchased by the employer; 94 these premiums guarantee the
payment of all medical expenses and a portion of lost wages that result from
covered injuries, 95 with no dollar limit on the available coverage. These provisions give much more to victims in exchange for tort rights than current
proposals in Florida to abrogate speculative damages in automobile litigation
would provide. The latter proposals leave the victim only $5,000 of PIP insurance, a protection which he, rather than an employer or other third party
tortfeasor, paid for himself.96 Manifestly, the analogy between no-fault insurance and Workmen's Compensation breaks down. 97

88. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 13, at 485-87.
89. Courts saw the Workmen's Compensation Law as creating a genuine quid pro quo
between the employer and the employee. On the one hand, the employer gained from the
limited liability and the exclusiveness of the remedy provided by the act. In exchange, the
employer paid for the Workmen's Compensation insurance. On the other hand, the employee
no longer had to carry the burden of proving that his injury proximately resulted from his
employer's negligence. Further, the employer was deprived of such defenses as contributory
negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant rule. In exchange, the worker gave
up his common law remedy against the employer. See Grice v. Suwannee Lumber Manufacturing Co., 113 So. 2d 742, 746 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1959).
90. FLA. STAT. §440.05 (1966) (amended by 1970 Fla. Laws, ch. 70-149). See Vanlandingham
v. Florida Power & Light Co., 154 Fla. 628, 18 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1944) (the court held the
relationship of employer and employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act to be a form
of a voluntary contract, since either may reject coverage of the act).
91. See Schroll, Workmen's Compensation, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 387 (1972).
92. FLA. STAT. §440.05 (1975). Only corporate officers may now reject the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation laws.
93. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). See text accompanying note 75 supra.
94. FLA. STAT. §440.10 (1975).
95. FLA. STAT. §§440.12-.13 (1975).
96. See Insurance Dep't Report, supranote 1, at 47.
97. It should also be noted in comparing Workmen's Compensation with no-fault insurance that the contractual undertones of employer-employee Workmen's Compensation
relationships were not totally abrogated when the application of the law was made mandatory. Unlike accident victims, workers have, at least theoretically, a great deal of freedom in
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In Sunspan Engineering and Construction Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding
Co.)"' the Supreme Court of Florida applied the "reasonable alternative remedy" test to a second aspect of Workmen's Compensation. That decision concerned a 1971 Florida law9" providing that when an employee collecting Workmen's Compensation sues a third party tortfeasor, the third party can not in
turn file a complaint against the employer for the employer's part of the negligence. 100 In Sunspan the employee had sued Spring-Lock for negligently manufacturing a scaffold, and Spring-Lock in turn filed a third party complaint
against the employer, Sunspan, for negligent construction or operation of the
scaffolding tower.101 Not surprisingly, the employer claimed the statutory immunity. This claim failed when the supreme court held that such immunity
violated the right to redress clause of the Florida Constitution. 02 Applying the
reasonable alternative remedy test, the court reasoned that unlike the employee,
the third party tortfeasor received absolutely nothing in return for the abolition of his common law action. The court stated that the law granting immunity to the employer, as applied in that case, was "an arbitrary and capricious innovation without any rational basis furthering any overpowering public
necessity and is therefore contrary to article I, §21, Florida Constitution."103
Subsequently, the Florida supreme court evaluated the Wrongful Death
Act'10 under the reasonable alternative remedy test. This law merged the survival action 05 for personal injuries of the deceased with the old wrongful death
action 0 6 into one basis of recovery. The legislation contained two major
changes. First, it eliminated the claim for the pain and suffering of the decedent
from the date of injury to the date of death. In its place was a provision for
claims by close relatives for their personal pain and suffering caused by the loss

determining with which employer-tortfeasor they will associate, thereby enabling them to a
greater extent to calculate the risks in advance.
98. 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975).
99. This was an attempt by the legislature to overturn the court's decision in Trail
Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 235 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1970), where the court held that the
Workmen's Compensation Act did not preclude passively negligent third-party tortfeasors,
who were held liable to an injured employee, from obtaining indemnity from an actively
negligent employer who had made payments of compensation and medical benefits to the
injured employee, if the employer was primarily negligent.
100. FLA. STAT. §440.11(1) (1973) provides that "[t]he liability of an employer prescribed
in §440.10 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to any third
party tort-feasor and the employee ...and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
from such employer... on account of such injury or death ..
101. 310 So. 2d at 5.
102. Id. at 8.
103. Id. In another case, the Florida supreme court upheld the abrogation of the right
of an employee of one subcontractor to sue for the alleged negligence of another subcontractor on the same job. Because the statute provided for Workmen's Compensation benefits
to be paid to the injured employee regardless of which subcontractor was negligent, the court
reasoned that a reasonable alternative remedy had been provided. Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v.
Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1977).
104. FLA. STAT. §§768.16-.27 (1975).
105. FLA. STAT. §46.021 (1975).
106. FLA. STAT. §§768.01-.03 (1971) (repealed by 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-35).
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of the decedent.' 0 7 In Martin v. United Security Services °s the court held that
"the new right of surviving close relatives to recover for their own pain
and suffering brought about by the wrongful death of a decedent is a reasonable alternative to dividing among the survivors the amount formerly recoverable .
1..."109
The second change in the new law precluded anyone but
lineal descendants and the spouse of the decedent from collecting a loss of the
decedent's net accumulations beyond the date of his death. 110 Thus, heirs who
are not a spouse or child of the decedent lost a substantial element of recovery,
since the law no longer permits estates generally to collect the amount the decedent might have accumulated by the end of his life expectancy. 1 In White
1 2
this limitation on recovery was challenged by heirs of an estate
v. Clayton,"
which, as a result of the new statute, could no longer collect these damages.
The attack was rejected by the court, which reasoned that the new act, in contrast to prior law, will increase damages in some circumstances and decrease
them in others. 3 The court held that the right of recovery in wrongful death
actions had not been abolished, as "only the elements of damage have been
changed." 114 According to White, those persons affected by the wrongful death
of the decedent had, when considered in the aggregate, received a reasonable
alternative remedy in exchange for the original remedies previously available.
The reasoning of the case suggests that an alternative remedy need not be provided to specific individuals in a particular case as long as the law in question
provides, in the aggregate, a reasonable alternative remedy for the wrongdoing
at issue.11 Consequently, the legislature will be free to change the distribution
of damages awarded to effect a more equitable result.
The reasonable alternative test has been the law in Florida since 1973.
Many changes have taken place in the no-fault laws since the last time they
107. FLA. STAT. §768.21 (1975) (provides for recovery for mental pain and suffering from
date of the decedent's injury for the surviving spouse, minor children, and parents of a
deceased minor).
108. 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1975).
109. Id. at 771. It is important to note that the court held that there was an adequate
alternative remedy despite the fact that in some cases certain heirs, who are not close relatives, will lose pain and suffering damages and receive nothing in return.
110. FLA. STAT. §768.21(6) (1975) provides that "If the decedent's survivors include a
surviving spouse or lineal descendants, loss of net accumulations beyond death and reduced to
present value may also be recovered."
111. See Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914) (the estate of
a deceased infant was allowed to collect for net loss of accumulations calculated from the decedent's majority).
112. 323 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975). The plaintiffs in that case were the sisters of the decedent,
and thus the estate was not permitted under §768.21 to collect loss of net accumulations.
113. Id. at 575.
114. Id. Undoubtedly the proponents of the elimination of speculative damages will rely
on this language. One appealing argument is that pain and suffering are merely elements
of damage and thus can be freely eliminated. However, the right is to a reasonable remedy
and not to particular damages. It is unclear how a reasonable remedy can be given to
automobile accident victims when pain and suffering are removed as elements of damage and
nothing is substituted in their stead.
115. For a strong dissent from this kind of application of the alternative remedy test, see
White v. Clayton, 323 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1975) (Adkins, J., dissenting).
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were challenged. It is appropriate, therefore, to review the changes and proposed modifications to determine their possible effect on the constitutionality
of the no-fault law.
APPLYING THE Kluger TEST TO EXISTING LEGISLATION

When the court in Lasky decided that the partial elimination of speculative
damages had been adequately replaced, it pointed to specific reasonable alternative remedies."- 6 The first of these was the speedy payment of initial benefits to
the victims.'"7 No-fault advocates have repeatedly cited the hardships imposed
by long delays before receipt of recovery - delays that pressure badly injured
victims, whose savings often are destroyed by resulting economic losses, to make
unreasonably low settlements. Prior to no-fault an average of sixteen months
elapsed between an accident and the time of payment;" 8a for losses exceeding
$2,500, the average delay was nineteen months."19 Under the no-fault statute
the victim is supposed to receive PIP benefits within 80 days of his written
notice to the insurer of a covered loss.20 One study has concluded that prompt
payment for these economic losses has given seriously injured victims the freedom to negotiate properly, resulting in a greater portion of the aggregate benefit money being paid to these vicdms.

21

Thus, at the time of Lasky a sub-

stantial benefit inured to accident victims in the form of speedier payments.
The second benefit given accident victims in place of speculative damages
was the guaranteed recovery of economic loss, even where the victim was at
fault.

22

Prior to the introduction of no-fault, about 55 per cent of those seri-

ously injured received absolutely nothing from automobile liability insurance. 2 3 Forty-five per cent of the seriously injured recovered no damages at all
under the tort system.

24

Where there was recovery, only one-third came from

25

tort claims.
A major reason for the inadequate record of the tort system is
its many barriers between the innocent victim and adequate compensation,
such as the difficulty of gathering sufficient evidence, the various immunities
protecting defendants, the possibility that the defendant will disappear or be
insolvent, the delays in compensation, the requirement that all losses be estimated at trial rather than compensated as they arise, and the high cost of legal
counsel. 28 Thus, at the time of Lasky the guaranteed payment of economic
losses covered under PIP insurance was a substantial benefit received in ex116. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
117. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 14 (Fla. 1974).
118. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE AcCIDENT INJURIES 52 (1970).
119. Id.
120. FLA. STAT. §627.736(4)(b) (1975).
121. Little, No-Fault Auto Reparationsin Florida:An Empirical Examination of Some of
its Effects, 9 U. MIcH. J. LAW REFORM 1, 36 (1975).
122. FLA. STAT. §627.736 (1975).
123.

124.

U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION REPORT, supra note 117, at 37-38.
CONARD, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS - STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF

INJURY REPARATION 186 (1964).

125.
126.

Leatherberry, supra note 9, at 127.
See R. KYEETON AND J. O'CONNELL, supra note 13, at 15-34,
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change for the partial abrogation of speculative damages. Although victims
were forced to purchase their own remedies by buying first party coverage, such
method of guaranteed first party protection was a realistic alternative that
offered speed and certainty.
The third major alternative benefit given to accident victims under no-fault
at the time of Lasky was the requirement that all drivers maintain liability
insurance for bodily injury in order to meet the Financial Responsibility
Laws. 127 At the time of Lasky the minimum needed to meet this requirement
was $15,000 of liability coverage per person, and $30,000 per accident, for personal injuries caused by the insured.128 These requirements gave the seriously
injured victim an additional pool of insurance money from which to seek recovery, a substantial alternative remedy in light of the number of insolvent or
29

judgment-proof tortfeasors.1

The fourth alternative remedy that the victim received was immunity from
tort liability when he is at fault.13 0 Immunity in other accidents is considered
an alternative remedy because courts view drivers as a class, not as individual
victims and tortfeasors. This view is consistent with the modem one that legal
negligence in an automobile accident should not be equated with moral
culpability. 31 Whether this immunity should be given much weight is unclear,
since the abrogation of every common law remedy necessarily gives rise to a
complementary immunity.132 However, in a situation where the general public
is nearly as likely to be a victim as a tortfeasor, as in an ordinary negligence
case, such an immunity is especially significant, 133 since a large portion of
drivers are likely to benefit from it eventually.
Since the 1974 testing of the no-fault law in Lasky, the original act has
undergone substantial changes. Several of these changes affect either the tort
threshold or the alternative remedies available. Therefore, the changes must
be examined for potential problems arising from the right to redress clause.
The first major modification occurred in 1976, when the personal injury
127. FLA. STAT. §324.021(7) (1973) (amended by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-266). The effect of
this statute was abrogated by Fla. Law 77-468 §6 (1977) which completely redefined the term
"motor vehicle." Automobiles need now only carry no-fault PIP benefits.
128. Id.
129. See text accompanying notes 125-127 supra. The court in Lasky did not openly recognize the Financial Responsibility Laws as one of the alternative remedies. However, since
the legislature was free to repeal or require this insurance, and since it was directly related to
the problem addressed by no-fault, it is fair to say that the Financial Responsibility Laws
were an alternate remedy at the time of Lasky.
130. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 14 (Fla. 1974). The court's willingness to
look at the alternative remedy given individuals generally, and not in specific instances, supports the interpretation given to White v. Clayton, 323 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1975). See also note
113 supraand accompanying text.
131. See note 18 supra.
132. See Comment, Constitutionally Incorporated Common Law - The Connecticut
Remedy Clause Limits Legislative Abridgement of Plaintiff's Rights: Gentile v. Altermatt, 8
CONN. L. REv. 753, 765 (1976).
133. See Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1, 15 (1975) (the court took the
complementary immunity, as well as the lower premiums, into consideration as alternative
remedies).
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threshold was rewritten.34 Prior to 1976, the basic nonpermanent injury tort
threshold was met when the victim received the equivalent of $1,000 in medical
treatment for his injury. 35 Critics charged that this threshold was subject to
easy manipulation which caused an overutilization of medical services.236 The
legislature replaced that provision in 1976 with a requirement that the injury
be serious enough to materially affect the injured person's "lifestyle" or
"normal activity" during substantially all of the 90-day period after the occurrence of the injury.' 37 The Florida Insurance Commissioner predicted that
a greater number of cases would be permitted in tort under the new law, increasing the total amount of speculative damages paid out. 38 If this projection
is correct, the 1976 change is more liberal and rests on more secure constitutional grounds. That is, with respect to the right to redress clause, the victim
would be receiving more in exchange for his tort rights than he did at the time
of the court's approval in Lasky.
In the second major change, the PIP insurance provision was rewritten so
that only a portion of economic losses is paid. The new law requires the
PIP insurer to pay only 80 per cent of the expenses of covered medical services
and losses to gross income (60 per cent if not includable in gross income for
13
federal income tax purposes), up to the $5,000 limit. This provision will not
reduce the maximum benefits payable by the PIP insurer. The law merely curtails the payout rate on the same $5,000. Previously, the PIP insurer paid out
$5,000 of benefits as the first $5,000 of covered economic losses accrued. Now,
the insurer pays $5,000 of benefits as the first $6,250140 of economic losses accrue.' 41 This affects PIP coverage as an alternative remedy in two respects.
First, for injuries involving less than $6,250 of economic losses, the insured will
no longer be guaranteed $5,000 or full economic recovery. 42 Second, the injured party will now be forced to go into the tort system to recover the 20 per
43
cent not paid by the PIP insurer from the driver at fault. The 1977 revision
134. FLA. STAT. §627.737(2) (1975) (amended by 1976! Fla. Laws, ch. 76-266).
135. For a description of the old threshold, see note 79 supra.
136. For an explanation of how and why this kind of abuse was taking place, see
O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, 56 NEB. L. REv. 23, 29
n.47 (1977).
137. For a description of the new threshold, see note 26 supra.
138. Insurance Dep't Report, supra note 1, at 18. However, the Commissioner expressed
hope that the new threshold would decrease the overutilization of medical benefits.
139. FLA. STAT. §627.736 (amended by 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468 §33).
140. This figure is based on economic losses that fall into the 80% recovery category. The 60% category includes only losses to gross income which are not includable in
gross income for federal income tax purposes. If there were losses from the 60% category,
the total losses needed to collect the $5,000 of benefits would be $8,333.
141. This change in PIP benefits appears to have resulted from an effort by the legislature

to further cut back the overutilization of medical and wage benefits.
142. For example, assuming the victim had $3,000 of "80 percent" economic losses, under
the old law he would be guaranteed $3,000 in benefits. All that is guaranteed now is $2,400

in benefits.
143. See Florida Department of Insurance Press Release, (June, 1977). This method of
recovery is slower, more expensive, and more complicated. Moreover, recovery is no longer
guaranteed, since liability insurance is not required.
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of the no-fault act permits the victim to sue, regardless of whether he meets the
44
tort threshold, for the 20 per cent he can not recover from the PIP insurer?
As a result of this change, one of the major benefits of no-fault will no longer
be enjoyed because many people may forfeit the 20 per cent differential, rather
than undertake the expensive and time consuming process of litigation. 1 4
This change severely devalues PIP insurance as an alternative remedy.
In addition, the legislature in 1977 raised the amount of deductible available to PIP policy holders. At the time of the Lasky decision the PIP policy
holder could elect a maximum deductible of $1,000. Currently, the policy
holder can choose as much as a $4,000 deductible for his PIP policy. 1 46 One of
the major distinctions noted by the Lasky court between the personal injury
threshold and the property threshold was that "the owner of a motor vehicle
is required to maintain security (either by insurance or otherwise) for payment
of the no-fault benefits, and has no tort immunity if he fails to meet this requirement.147 In effect, under the new law, as under that examined in Kluger,
PIP coverage has become all but optional. Currently, the required PIP coverage is $5,000, subject to a $4,000 deductible under the 1977 changes, thus
guaranteeing only $1,000 of protection to the accident victim. Furthermore,
because the victim receives only 80 per cent of his covered losses under PIP,
his guaranteed statutory remedy is whittled down to 80 per cent of his losses
between $5,000 and $6,250. The total effect of these changes is to take away
the payment guaranteed, regardless of fault, that was crucial to the Lasky
holding.1 48 Additionally, they have extinguished the quick receipt of first
dollar coverage that once allowed seriously injured victims the time they
needed to negotiate a reasonable settlement. Thus the new deductible precludes the victim from collecting the first $4,000 of economic losses from either
the insurer or the at-fault party.1 49 This change is probably unconstitutional
under the Florida supreme court's rationale in Kluger. In Kluger the court
emphasized the fact that the victim was not required to purchase first party
coverage for the first $550 of damage. Since the tortfeasor was immune from
liability the victim could be left without a remedy. The new deductible proyision and the provision struck down in Kluger differ only in that the PIP
policy holder, although required to purchase PIP insurance, can elect to
forego the first $4,000 of coverage. Any difference between the option not to
purchase insurance and to elect such a large deductible is tenuous at best.
144. This is so because the tort threshold, which remained unchanged since the 1976 revision, provides immunity only for PIP benefits paid or payable. Since the 20% is not
paid or payable by PIP insurance the victim is free to sue the driver at fault.
145. In the case of a driver at fault, he will not be paid his full economic loss. He can
only collect 80% from his insurer, and unlike his victim, he does not have the option to
sue for the remaining 20%.
146. FLA. STAT. §627.739(1) (1975) (as amended by 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468 §37).
147. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 13 (Fla. 1974).
148. Id. at 14. The court in Lasky emphasized that PIP benefits were "compulsory." ld.
With the growing deductibles, this is no longer true.
149. One cannot help but wonder how many insurance agents will actually take the time
to explain the full effects of selecting a deductible to their customers. See note 68 supra and
accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the people who are likely to choose the high deductibles are the
poor, who are actually most in need of coverage but are seeking to cut costs
by limiting their insurance to the minimum requirements of the law. As victims they would be left without their needed remedy, since they are not insured for the first $4,000 of economic losses. On the other hand, proponents of
the law may observe that the law validated in Lasky gave the insured an option
of a $1,000 deductible. 150 The new provision may be a mere extension of the
same concept - a $4,000, instead of a $1,000, deductible. However, courts may
likely view this change as a difference in kind, rather than a difference of degree.
The fourth major change in 1977 was the elimination of the requirement
that drivers carry $10,000 per person, $20,000 per acident, bodily injury liability insurance. 15' This change drastically reduced the victim's amount of
guaranteed recovery. 5 2 Viewed formerly as a factor in the legislature's provision for an adequate alternative remedy, its removal may be of constitutional
significance.
The legislature has taken away much of what the Lasky court labeled as the
alternative remedy at the time of its approval of the tort limitation. Under a
similar tort threshold, the victim is no longer guaranteed either the speed or
certainty of PIP coverage with the new deductibles. Furthermore, the victim
has lost the assurance of the large pool of liability insurance. These factors
raise questions as to whether the 1977 changes leave the automobile accident
victim with an adequate alternative remedy in exchange for his traditional tort
claim.153
PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE ALL SPECULATIVE DAMAGES

If the 1977 legislation rests on questionable constitutional underpinnings,
then any attempt to make further reductions in allowable speculative damages
would be even more vulnerable to attack. Under the reasonable alternative test
set forth in Kluger, the court must weigh the value of the common law remedy
abrogated and compare it with the legislated replacement. Should it ever be
150.
151.

§627.739 (1973) (as amended by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-266 §6).
At the time of the court's decision in Lasky the minimum bodily injury liability
insurance requirement was $15,000 per person, $30,000 per accident. FLA. STAT. §324.021(7)
FLA. STAT.

(1973). However, in 1976 this was reduced to coverage of $10,000 per person, $20,000 per
accident. See 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-266. The 1977 legislation completely redefined "motor
vehicles" and thereby exempted automobiles which carried PIP coverage from these requirements. See 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-468 §6.
152. Most motorists may not realize the full effect of choosing to buy only PIP insurance.
If the motorist drives out of state, and is involved in an accident, the victim could sue him
and the Floridian will not be able to rely on any immunity. Thus for practical purposes, the
persons who purchase only PIP insurance are uninsured motorists when they travel out of
state.
153. The Florida supreme court has yet to rule on such challenges to the 1977 changes. In
State v. Lee, Case No. 52,076 (Fla. Sept. 7, 1977), the supreme court ruled the "good driver's
fund" portion of the law unconstitutional. In an opinion filed on Feb. 28, 1978, the Florida
supreme court ruled that §42 of Fla. Law 77-468 was severable from the rest of the act.
However, the court specifically added, "In so doing, however, we express no opinion as to
the constitutionality of each of the remaining sections of chapter 77-468." Id. at 11.
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faced with legislation that eliminates all speculative damages in automobile
negligence suits, the court likely will first examine what has been given in exchange. If an attempt is made to eliminate speculative damages without providing more than what the 1977 Florida no-fault law currently provides, the
xesulting law could be held unconstitutional.154 However, that is not to say
that an alternative remedy cannot be formulated which could be considered
adequate or even preferable to the tort system, as in the case of Workmen's
Compensation. Speculative damages in automobile litigation have been labelled
a "quixotic luxury" in a system which does not fully compensate even for
pecuniary losses, especially in the serious cases. 5 5 In one proposal the right to
speculative damages would be traded for raising the PIP guaranteed recovery
to $35,000.156 Such an increase in benefits probably would help ensure the constitutionality of an elimination of speculative damages. So far the court has
provided few clues as to the weight which should be accorded PIP coverage;
that is, how much pain and suffering can be eliminated for every dollar of
PIP coverage. However, when and if the court decides the constitutionality of
the 1977 reforms, it will likely give further guidelines to the reasonable alternative test. In doing so, the court may decide the fate of any plans to eliminate speculative damages from automobile litigation.
CONCLUSION

Florida court decisions have established that the legislature is not free to
abolish speculative damages in automobile litigation without providing a substantial alternative remedy." 7 The 1977 changes have cast doubt on the constitutionality of Florida's no-fault law in light of the requirements of the right
to redress clause of the Florida Constitution. Interpretations of this clause by
the Supreme Court of Florida mandate that legislation abrogating a common
law remedy must pass the court's "reasonable alternative test". This test provides for a balancing approach allowing the legislature to make some adjustments in remedies as the changing times demand, while at the same time protecting the basic rights of individuals. Although Florida urgently needs fast
and effective changes in its insurance legislation to remedy the ongoing automobile insurance rate crisis, legislators will not find a solution by attempting
to abolish speculative damages in automobile negligence litigation, since any
legislative abolition must be accompanied by alternative remedies that will cost
consumers substantially the same amount of money. If the abolition of speculative damages is to succeed in reducing drivers' exposure to liability, and thus
154. Although it appears fairly clear that the law does not provide an adequate alternative remedy, it is unclear how far the court will go in finding an overpowering public necessity for the abolition of speculative damages.
155. Blum and Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi:Auto Accidents and General
Deterrence,34 U. CmI. L. REV. 239, 270 (1967).
156. See Gainesville Sun, May 19, 1977, at 1-C, col. 4 (where state Senator McKay is reported to have made such a proposal).
157. But cf. Insurance Dep't Report, supra note 1, at 49 n.17 (where the Florida department stated that it had made a sludy of the law and found that the proposal to eliminate
speculative damages "is clearly within the constitutional authority of the Legislature").
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their insurance cost, it will have to be accomplished by an amendment to the
15 s
Florida Constitution.
JoHN B. GALLAGHER
158. Florida Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter is currently urging the adoption of such
a constitutional amendment called the "fair amendment." See Gainesville Sun, Jan. 7, 1978,
at 16-A, col. 1.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

21

